During his tenure as defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov recognized that Ukraine needed to fight deep behind Russian lines:
“Russia always works at operational depth,” he said. “This is how Russian doctrine is built; Russia essentially created the concept.” Indeed, Isserson, the Soviet deep operations theorist, wrote in 1937 that “In foreign bourgeois literature we cannot find the same concept of deep combat which already lies at the foundation of our tactics.” Therefore, Fedorov prioritized the transformation to a higher-echelon corps system, which allowed Ukraine to fight at depth and enabled a shift from fighting a tactical, attritional fight to an operational-level one.
To strike Russia at depth, Fedorov introduced the middle-strike campaign, explaining: “[First-person-view] drones reshaped the tactical level of warfare. Deep-strike drones and missiles hit strategic targets deep inside Russia. Middle-strike operations fill the gap between them, enabling systematic strikes at ranges of around 30-200 km.” The campaign sought to target “critical infrastructure that supports the front line: ammunition depots, command posts, supply routes, air defense systems, radars, and drone control centers.” In 2026, Fedorov put five times more funds toward the procurement of middle-strike systems than in 2025, like the $5,000 AI-enabled Hornet drone. The Ministry of Defense reported that between January and June 2026, successful drone strikes beyond fifty kilometers increased forty-four times.
The campaign involved more than just drones; for example, Fedorov also prioritized extended-range artillery ammunition. He pushed for domestic production of 155-millimeter rounds with ranges over thirty kilometers and canceled purchases of shorter-range rounds. He recognized that since artillery emplaced far to the rear to avoid observation and since the dispersed close fight in the contested zone was often twenty kilometers wide, rounds with ranges under thirty kilometers contributed little to the fight—especially considering 155-millimeter artillery was often consolidated into corps artillery units for deep targeting, he saw no use in providing them with short-range ammunition.
Ukraine began to dominate Russia at depth by first targeting radar and air defense systems. Between March and May 2026, Ukraine reportedly destroyed eighty-one air defense systems. On May 27, Fedorov transitioned to the “logistics lockdown” campaign to “systematically destroy Russian logistics, warehouses, equipment, command posts, and supply routes at operational depth.” Russian logistics have been severed along the highways and railways that provide Russia’s primary lines of communications in southern Ukraine.
This campaign degraded Russian drone operations. Ukrainian units have searched the battlefield in depth to destroy Russian drone operators and launch sites. Due to the logistics lockdown, Russia struggles to send replacement operators, drones, and parts. Reinforcing this campaign, which has knocked out 50 percent of Russia’s oil refining capacity, the middle-strike campaign has exacerbated fuel shortages. Russian drone operators face challenges in finding fuel to charge their drones or radios. Fedorov also persuaded Elon Musk to turn off StarLink for Russian forces, which added a further disruption to their drone operations.


